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Abstract
NAFTA's Chapter 11 tribunals were created to protect
foreign investors from undue interference by host States.
These tribunals have considerable adjudicative power in
their own right, power that is international in nature.
Consequently, Chapter 11 tribunals allow private entities,
even relatively small ones, to have a voice in the
international legal forum. This Note uses a few major
tribunal decisions as case studies to illustrate the potential
problems arising from the NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals
and then points out that this leaves open significant
opportunities for international expansion by foreign
investors in the NAFTA bloc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization is an ongoing process that is heavily promoted by
some people, reviled by others, and misunderstood by many. It can be
roughly defined as the increasingly free movement goods and services
globablly.1
In the United States, the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") has been perhaps the greatest symbol of globalization and its
attendant "negative" effects, encapsulated most memorably by Ross Perot's
"giant sucking sound" description. While organizations like the World
Trade Organization have done considerably more to promote the interests of
globalization and international economic efficiency, NAFTA is a much
nearer phenomenon and therefore occupies more of the American public's
* J.D. The Ohio State University Michael E. Moritz College of Law, expected May
2009.
1 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 24 (Aspen Publishers 2005).
2 Ross PEROT WITH PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY: WHY NAFTA
MUST BE STOPPED-NOW! 41 (Hyperion Books 1993).
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attention. Furthermore, since it directly affects the United States and its
two neighbors, the politics of NAFTA also hit closer to home.
NAFTA has had clear effects on the American economy.
Naturally, NAFTA has also affected the legal systems of the U.S. and its
NAFTA trading partners, Canada and Mexico. Free trade agreements
("FTAs"), such as NAFTA, are particularly important to consider because
they "internationalize" the scope of the value judgments made by domestic
judges, giving greater scope and power to courts that rule in cases
concerning FTAs.3  As an example, the Fifth Circuit had no problem
finding jurisdiction over a dispute between two Mexican companies when
the only real tie to the U.S. was the cargo being given over from one
company to the other; this indirectly resulted from the growth in trade
between the U.S. and Mexico thanks to NAFTA.4 This example illustrates
how NAFTA indirectly has expanded the jurisdiction of U.S. courts (and
opened similar reciprocal expansion by Mexican and Canadian courts over
U.S. persons).
This Note is concerned with the power that NAFTA has arguably
carved out in its own right, independent of the signatory States;5 this power
is then more directly passed on to private, legal entities. The most obvious
way to explore this phenomenon is through the vehicle of NAFTA's
Chapter 11, a provision meant to protect investors against expropriation by
foreign governments by creating security and predictability. 6 Despite the
fact that NAFTA is just one of approximately two thousand investment
treaties that are currently in effect, it is subject to a disproportionate amount
of scholarship, and much of that attention is focused squarely on NAFTA's
controversial Chapter 11 and the potentially powerful tribunals it creates. 7
This controversial provision has been derided by both sides of the political
spectrum with "the political right wary of its intrusion on sovereignty" and
"the political left concerned that it favors investor rights over public welfare
and chills appropriate environmental regulation that happens to interfere
with investment." 8 Depending on the article, the journal and the intended
3 Andrew J. Walker, Conflict of Laws Analyses for the Era of Free Trade, 20 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2005).4 1d. at 1164-67.
5 In this article, the term "State" is capitalized to signify that it refers to an international
State, as opposed to a state within the United States.
6 Howard Mann & Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA's Chapter 11 and the Environment:
Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-State Process on the Environment 6 (1999)
(working paper, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf).
7 Catherine M. Amirfar & Elyse M. Dreyer, Thirteen Years ofNAFTA 's Chapter 11:
The Criticisms, the United States's Responses, and Lessons Learned, 20 N.Y. INT'L L.
REv. 39, 39 (2007).
8 John B. Fowles, Swords Into Plowshares: Softening the Edge ofNAFTA's Chapter 11
Regulatory Expropriations Provisions, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 83, 84 (2006). Interestingly,
NAFTA is the product of a Democratic Congress and Republican President, though
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audience of a journal, commentators (be they scholars, practitioners, or
students) often take on a single issue and deal with it in a very precise
manner. While this method of study is informative and interesting, it
usually fails to achieve a more "macro" perspective or derive any broader
understanding which can more easily be applied to real practice.
9
What gets lost in the academic to-and-fro are the long-term effects
on the U.S. legal system, i.e., how NAFTA is expanding the power of the
legal systems of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, and what NAFTA is taking
away from those legal systems. Of even greater concern, perhaps, is what
power is being apportioned to none of the three NAFTA States but is
instead devolving upon private entities.
This Note attempts to examine that dynamic by first briefly
describing NAFTA generally and Chapter 11 specifically in Section II, then
examining and analyzing a few of the major arbitrations involving Chapter
11 in Section III. Finally, in Section IV, the author hopes to point out the
potential power that Chapter 11 has created for individuals in the
international domain (confined currently to the NAFTA countries, although
a major expansion of that domain is possible) and how much potential this
opens up to smaller businesses.
II. NAFTA AND CHAPTER 11 - A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. NAFTA Generally
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to keep in mind the
goals of NAFTA. NAFTA seeks to employ principles such as national
treatment, most-favored nation, and transparency in order to: 1) promote the
elimination of trade barriers to facilitate trade in the concerned territories, 2)
substantially increase the investment opportunities in the territories of the
signatory States, 3) protect intellectual property rights, 4) create or enhance
effective enforcement mechanisms, and 5) generally promote free trade and
President Bush's endorsement received considerable support and a few improvements
from his successor, President Clinton.
9 This is not to say that such articles do not exist-they do-however, so much of the
scholarship is disjointed and narrowly focused that it becomes difficult for those who
are not immersed in this area to gain a broad perspective without at least partially
immersing themselves. For good general overviews of the mechanics of NAFTA's
Chapter 11 and broader impact outlooks, see also Amirfar & Dreyer, supra note 7, and
Jessica S. Wiltse, Comment, An Investor-State Dispute Mechanism in the Free Trade
Area of the Americas: Lessons from NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 1145
(2003).
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amity between the signatory States.'0  As the guiding forces, these
objectives drive much of the implementation and interpretation of NAFTA.
NAFTA creates relatively few substantive legal standards,
preferring that signatory States harmonize their legal systems via
negotiation and cooperation." However, this broad rule is qualified by the
obvious provision that signatory States must conform their legal systems to
NAFTA standards, when and where necessary.' 2 NAFTA members must
also avoid anti-competitive practices, although the provision proscribing
this behavior is not enforceable and therefore non-binding. 3 NAFTA
negotiators were uncomfortable in creating binding standards regarding
non-trade matters.'
4
1. Procedure
While NAFTA does not dictate the creation of substantive laws, it
does create basic standards for domestic legislative procedure. 5 Certain
provisions of NAFTA essentially create due process by requiring that there
be advance publication of guidelines concerning governmental procurement
of goods and services as well as advance notice of any economically-related
measure that may be adopted, and that a reasonable amount of time is
allowed so that interested parties can comment upon the proposed
measure. 6 The reasoning for this was simple: if the signatory States were
expected under NAFTA to harmonize their domestic laws, then all three
States would require transparent legislative procedure in order to assure
other governments and their citizens that the legislative process was fair and
open. 17 Otherwise, interested parties, foreign or otherwise, would have no
ability to comment on the legislative process, let alone influence it.'
8
This is not necessarily nefarious, however; it is only fair that under
a free trade agreement all parties involved should at least be able to see the
1 Carvana Hicks, The NAFTA Aftermath: Analyzing a Free Trade Agreement
Defectively Designed to Perpetuate Poverty and Defendency in Rural Mexico, 13-SUM
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 49, 51 (2004).
" Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The
Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 401,402 (1995).
12 Id. at 409.
"3 Id. at 409, 411-14. Negotiators were so uncomfortable with non-trade issues, nothing
was included in NAFTA to deal with the illegal immigration issue that was of serious
concern in the early 1990s and is now a headlining political issue in the United States.
See also, Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican
Immigration to the United States, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 937, 959-60 (1994).
14Johnson, supra note 13, at 959-60.
15 Zamora, supra note 11, at 410.
16 id.
'
7 1d
18 id.
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rules of operation in other signatory States so that foreign economic entities
enter those States forewarned of potential dangers.
2. Enforcement
NAFTA does not create specific enforcement mechanisms across
the board; instead, it creates general standards and requires only that certain
minimum requirements be fulfilled. 19 The minimum standards require of
signatory States that at least proper notice be given to potential defendants,
that these defendants be allowed the opportunity to present evidence in their
defense, and that there generally be available civil and criminal remedies
for claimants.2z
Aside from these basics, however, Mexico has also had to adopt
supplementary agreements, meant to ensure that the Mexican government
will enforce certain kinds of domestic laws, such as environmental and
labor laws. 21 Generally, there are concerns that Mexico's judicial system,
though traditionally weak (although there has been reform in recent years),
should not necessarily be reformed in the image of the American judicial
system, which is litigious and therefore expensive.22
3. Thoughts on General Framework of NAFTA
Essentially, NAFTA, by creating legal requirements and standards,
has given Canadian and American entities the ability to penetrate and
strongly influence the Mexican legal system, although this is not the
intended outcome.
Ideally, Mexican laws would not be substantively affected by the
increased pressures applied by the United States and Canada as the
economies of the NAFTA signatory States become more and more
integrated. Even when seeking to attract investment, Mexico is still
sovereign within its territory and can theoretically dictate laws to both
domestic and foreign entities.
Realistically, however, Mexican laws will be influenced by the
legal systems of their northern neighbors. Using the broader example of
securities law, the United States has a very well developed securities
regulation system, thanks to creation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and a powerful adjudication process.2 3 Consequently, rather
9 1d. at 412.
20 Id.
2 Zamora, supra note 11, at 411-12.
22 Id.
23 James A. Kehoe, Exporting Insider Trading Laws: The Enforcement of US. Insider
Trading Laws Internationally, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 345,348-51 (1995). Apparently,
the SEC has no problem accepting a leadership role in this area and is fairly aggressive
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than develop these laws from scratch, other States simply pattern their
securities regulations on those of the U.S., albeit making them a bit weaker
in the process. 24 Essentially, the U.S., as it expands its economic and
commercial domain, is able to bring its own laws with it and virtually
impose them on foreign systems, since those systems benefit so much from
U.S. investment and the attendant economic benefits. Of course, if the
purpose of the foreign legislature is to attract foreign investment, then this
loss of legislative independence may seem a small price to pay.
Procedurally, NAFTA creates many avenues for the American legal
influence. While it is fair for entities who may invest in a NAFTA State to
have some say in the legislative process, it is not realistic to assume that this
influence will be equal for all parties involved. A large U.S. corporation
seeking to influence a Mexican law could conceivably be more influential
because, relative to the overall economy, it is quite large and represents a
significant amount of money. By contrast, consider a large Mexican
corporation trying to do the same thing in the U.S. While it may be possible
that this Mexican corporation would have enough money to be worth
considering, more than likely, and relative to the overall American
economy, that Mexican corporation would have little or no influence. In
effect, by virtue of the larger economy from which they originate, American
corporations have greater potential for impact in the Mexican political arena
than a Mexican corporation will likely have in the American political arena.
This power imbalance is facilitated by NAFTA, since the Mexican
government has effectively signed on to allow this disparity to exist.
Even if the Mexican legislature could be relied on to operate
impartially, or at least not be unduly influenced by American corporations,
the Mexican judicial system is susceptible to improper influences and
needs, in the eyes of the U.S. and Canada, to be reformed.25 This
susceptibility to "improper influences" cuts both ways: not only can foreign
corporations take advantage of this looseness (though American
corporations would be bound within the confines of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act), but domestic corporations or claimants who are seeking to
attack a foreign corporation could secure a victory in their court system
using "improper practices." This instability is of serious concern to many
foreign corporations for obvious reasons. To cure this, some scholars argue
in trying to regulate insider trading internationally by working with foreign states in
developing or more rigorously implementing securities regulations.
24 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Substance, 42
VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 948-49 (2002). For other examples of similar trends, see Jurgen
Basedow, International Antitrust: From Extraterritorial Application to Harmonization,
60 LA. L. REV. 1037 (2000); Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International
Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Is It Necessary? Is It Possible?, 27 INT'L LAW 881
(1993); and Robert W. Hillman, Cross-Border Investment, Conflict of Laws and the
Privatization of Securities Laws, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 331 (1992).
25 Zamora, supra note 11.
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that if the Mexican system is reformed and modeled after the American or
Canadian system-systems heavily influenced by Western Europe-it
would be more acceptable, and, therefore, accessible and trustworthy to
foreign multinational corporations ("MNCs") by virtue of being more
familiar.26 In turn, American courts would not need to necessarily interfere
to protect the rights of American MNCs because the now-acceptable
Mexican courts would be able to adjudicate the matter fairly by American
standards.
The procedural and enforcement requirements written into NAFTA
are powerful and create the potential for a lot of American or Canadian
influence within Mexico. However, if these requirements do not allow
indirect American or Canadian influence, like necessary reform or
appropriate remedies, American or Canadian courts may be encouraged to
keep legal disputes in the American or Canadian judicial systems in order to
protect the interests of the American or Canadian corporations rather than
leaving them in the Mexican domestic courts. In other words, if American
and Canadian judges feel like natural or legal persons from their State may
not receive fair treatment in the Mexican legal system, they may keep the
dispute in the more sophisticated American or Canadian courts and thereby
effectively expand their jurisdiction. On the other hand, a stronger and
more acceptable Mexican legal system (both legislatively and judicially)
would quell this concern and perhaps discourage American and Canadian
courts from expanding their influence.
B. NAFTA Chapter 11
The previous discussion should have made clear that the mechanics
of free trade are not simple, even within the relatively small geopolitical
confines of the NAFTA bloc. There are legitimate concerns that foreign
investors operating under the auspices of NAFTA will not receive fair
treatment in a domestic court, potentially causing problems. Adjudicating
disputes fairly within this bloc is of great concern and NAFTA's
mechanism for adjudication outside of domestic courts is the tribunal
system, created under Chapter 11 of the Treaty.
NAFTA's Chapter 11, the more specific focus of this Note, is
unusual insofar as it breaks with the traditions of international law.
Previously, when one State expropriated the property of another State's
investor, the two States would resolve the conflict without directly
involving the aggrieved individual.27 NAFTA Chapter 11, on the other
hand, allows the investor to resort to direct actions against a State,
26 id.
27 Chow & Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 36. As Professors Chow and Schoenbaum
note, the realm of public international law has considerably expanded of late and now
encompasses public rights and governs commercial activities. Id.
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regardless of what a negotiated investment contract or concession says
about arbitration.28 NAFTA Chapter 1 1 is the first time such an agreement
was signed by two States with developed economies, and the implications
of this were not appreciated at the time for it has yielded considerable
litigation for both sides. 9
NAFTA Chapter 11 applies to "measures adopted or maintained by
a [p]arty" and how they apply to investors from the U.S., Canada and
Mexico and their investments. 30  Foreign investors operating within the
NAFTA bloc are granted "National Treatment" (treatment no less favorable
than treatment given to domestic investors) and "Most-Favored-Nation"
status (treatment no less favorable than treatment given to similar parties
from other States). This creates a minimum standard of treatment for all
natural and legal persons within the NAFTA bloc within any given State,
though one's status as a domestic or foreign investor may create fewer or
greater advantages, as we shall see.31 States are also expected to accord the
same "fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security" to all
persons within NAFTA by engaging in no discriminatory behavior (with
some exceptions).32
The most crucial article for the purposes of this Note is Article
1110: Expropriation and Compensation. This article was intended to
protect investors, and has created the most chatter among commentators.
Article 1110 forbids direct or indirect nationalization or expropriation of
another Party's investment, or an investment made by a citizen of a Party.33
Naturally, there are exceptions to this rule: a government may nationalize or
expropriate where the action is undertaken for a public purpose, is
28 Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 368 (2003).
29 William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Devloped Coutnries:
Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 15 (2006). Developed countries who sign bilateral investment treaties
("BITs") with developing countries usually include provisions similar to NAFTA
Chapter 11 in order to protect themselves from the urges of developing countries to
swallow up their investments. Since the investment tends to be a one-way street, the
developed country rarely, if ever, faces litigation from their BIT partner. Since both
Canada and the U.S. are developed and heavily invested in each others' economies,
Chapter 11 was bound to be used as a more effective way (potentially) for foreign
investors to recover money from the host State should an environmental or public health
regulation come into effect. This has proven to be the case. Id.
30 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, pt. 5, ch. 11, art. 1101,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639.
"J Id. at art. 1102-03, p. 639.
32 Id. at art. 1105, p. 640. The analysis for "national treatment" (Art. 1102) is similar to
"minimum standard of treatment" (Art. 1105) and both strongly inform the claim for a
violation of Art. 1110. See also Rene Lettow Lemer, International Pressure to
Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 229,248 (2001).
33 NAFTA, supra note 30 at art. 1110, p. 641-42.
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nondiscriminatory, and employs adequate due process and provides
compensation. 34 Compensation is to be the fair market value just prior to
the expropriation and must be paid promptly.35
NAFTA Chapter 11 also does not seek to impinge upon
environmental regulations that a Party may find necessary for the protection
of the environment or public health.36
The rest of the NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions are largely
procedural and will be referenced as necessary.
III. CASE STUDIES
A. Introduction
The first four cases examined in this section all have
commonalities. First, each seeks to recoup losses allegedly caused by
governmental regulatory measures, as opposed to more straightforward
transfer of property rights to the government.37  All of the regulatory
measures involved were purportedly undertaken for the betterment of the
public (a "public purpose").3 8 Each of these claims also argues that the
interferences with the property rights of the claimants had substantial
economic effects, so much so that compensation is required. 39 The last case
concerns water disputes, an area which will likely become more and more
contentious in the coming years, and may become more vulnerable to
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals.
Each case will be briefly outlined, with relevant case facts and
holdings emphasized, and then will be briefly analyzed, highlighting the
major implication of each holding.4 °
B. The Metalclad Case
Metalclad Corporation was a U.S. waste disposal company
operating a Mexican subsidiary ("COTERIN") that sought a municipal
34 Id.
35 Id.
" Id. at art. 1114.
37 Kevin Banks, NAFTA 's Article 1110-Can Regulation Be Expropriation?, 5 NAFTA:
L. & Bus. REV. AM. 499,503 (1999).38 Id. at 504.
39 Id.
40 The major criticisms of NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals were brilliantly dealt with in
Catherine M. Amirfar & Elyse M. Dreyer's article, supra note 7, which in many ways
mirrors this article, and does so more eloquently. As noted therein, the major criticisms
of NAFTA Chapter 1 1 tribunals are that they threaten finality of judgment in domestic
courts, potentially offset environmental and health regulations and create a competitive
advantage for foreign investors. Id. at 41.
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license to operate a hazardous waste treatment facility near Guadalcazar,
Mexico. 4' The license was rejected, although Metalclad did acquire three
permits from Mexican state and federal authorities. 42 Metalclad, upon the
assurances of federal and local regulators that no license was needed, began
to build its facility without a municipal license, although it chose to apply
for this permit, having already been rejected once.43 After Metalclad had
already invested considerable sums in the project and completed
construction, but before any permit was issued, the state government
declared the entire area an ecological zone, effectively closing down
Metalclad's operation and rendering its investment worthless. 4 Metalclad
then sought the protection of NAFTA Chapter 11 by filing claims against
Mexico for violating Articles 1105 and 1110.45 The tribunal made history
by ruling against a State and in favor of the foreign investor, going so far as
to award damages because Mexico had violated Articles 1105 and
1110(1).46
On appeal, Mexico argued that "[t]he tribunal committed two acts
in excess of jurisdiction in connection with Article 1 1 0 5 . ' 7 Mexico first
argued that "the Tribunal used NAFTA's transparency provisions as a basis
for finding a breach of Article 1105 . ' 48 Second, Mexico contended that the
Tribunal then created essentially new transparency obligations that have no
basis in the text of NAFTA.49 Furthermore, Mexico argued that the tribunal
inappropriately interpreted Mexican domestic law.50 The Supreme Court of
British Columbia, the appellate court, found these arguments compelling
enough to warrant a partial reversal of the tribunal's decision (a first).5'
The tribunal had construed expropriation in Article 11 10 too broadly,
making even incidental interference with an investment compensable even
when the host State derived no benefit from the interference.52 The appeals
41 United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664, 3, 6-7, 13 (2001),
available at
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Metalclad/MetalcladJudgement.pdf.
42 Id.
4' Fowles, supra note 8, at 95.
44 United Mexican States v. Metalclad, supra note 41, at 9, 11, 17.
45 Jennifer Trousdale, Comment and Casenotes, The International Investor's Guide to
Retaining a Successful NAFTA Chapter 11 Award on Appeal, 13 L. & Bus. REV. AM.
217,221 (2007).
46 Chris Tollefson, Metalclad v. United Mexican States Revisited: Judicial Oversight of
NAFTA 's Chapter II Investor-State Claim Process, 11 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 183,
194 (2002). See also Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 40 I.L.M. 36, 54 (Arb. Trib., Vancouver, B.C., Can. 2001).41 United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., supra note 41, at 66
48 Id.
49Id.
50 Id.
" Id. at 133-37.
52 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, supra note 46, at 50.
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court did not explicitly reject this broad expropriation idea but used a
different line of reasoning, one less nebulous and more tailor-made to this
particular case, thereby "dulling the edge of the proverbial sword" by
approaching the issue more cautiously.
53
The Metalclad case, when considered in conjunction with the
Methanex case (discussed infra) creates serious concerns about problems of
overly broad and too-narrow interpretations and generally inconsistent
rulings from NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals. Because these NAFTA
tribunals only bind the parties to the arbitration and have no precedential
value, the decisions made by one tribunal technically have no effect on any
future arbitrations. It is probably naYve, however, to think that later tribunals
never look back on the prior holdings for help and support.54
C. The S.D. Myers Case
S.D. Myers, Inc., a U.S. corporation, operated a Canadian
subsidiary that exported polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) to the U.S. for
disposal.5 5 Canada passed a neutral regulation that banned PCB exportation
because of environmental and human health safety concerns, which caused
S.D. Myers to bring a Chapter 11 claim against Canada for violation of
Articles 1102, 1105, 1106, and 1110.56 S.D. Myers claimed that Canada
prepared the measure with full knowledge of their business in Canada and
acted specifically against a U.S. investor.57 The tribunal found that both
Articles 1102 and 1105 had been violated because the Canadian
government had denied S.D. Myers treatment as favorable as other
similarly situated Canadian companies and because the Canadian
exportation ban "blatantly preferred domestic investors over foreign
investors. 58 The Article 1106 and I 110 claims were denied.59
The S.D. Myers case essentially undermined Canada's
environmental regulations and "obligations under international law to
53 Fowles, supra note 8, at 97-98.
54 Jessica C. Lawrence, Note, Chicken Little Revisited: NAFTA Regulatory
Expropriations After Methanex, 41 GA. L. REv. 261, 264 (2006). In the Metalclad
appeals decision, for example, Judge Tysoe of the British Columbia Supreme Court
references the reasoning of other NAFTA tribunal cases, choosing to reject at least the
reasoning of S.D. Myers (discussed infra). See Metalclad, supra note 46, 61-65.
55 Jessica S. Wiltse, Note, An Investor-State Dispute Mechanism in the Free Trade Area
ofthe Americas: Lessons from NAFTA Chapter 11, 51 BUFF. L. REv. 1145, 1166 (2003).
The PCBs were exported with the special permission of the Environmental Protection
Agency. Id.
16 Partial Award on the Merits, S.D. Meyers Inc. and Gov't of Canada, at 28-31, 130-
143 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/SDMyers/SDMyersMeritsAward.pdf.
57 Id at 29, 132.
58 Trousdale, supra note 45, at 223.
59 Partial Award, supra note 56, at 80, 322-23.
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prohibit the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes" using NAFTA
Chapter 11, a provision meant to protect investors against takings by a
foreign government. Canada's motives may not have been purely
environmental when passing the regulation, but the fact remains that an
environmental regulation, a matter of sovereign control, was nullified
quickly and effectively by a tribunal because of a single complaint brought
61by a lone foreign company.
S.D. Myers points to the strong ability of foreign investors to
circumvent environmental regulations that post-date the investment in the
host State; those investors can then exit a problematic situation with cash in
hand. Perhaps of even greater concern is the fact that domestic entities may
not be able to get similar treatment because they are limited to domestic
courts and do not have NAFTA Chapter 11 provisions to protect their
interests as strongly. This creates a strong competitive advantage for any
foreign entity in comparison to their domestic rivals, since foreign
companies do not have to "just live with" environmental regulations. This
advantage is particularly pronounced in chemical-related businesses, where
a business is just one high-profile study away from being dismantled.
D. The Loewen Case
The Loewen case was brought by a competitor of Loewen Group,
Inc., a Canadian funeral home company, in a Mississippi state court where a
questionable trial over a commercial dispute resulted in Loewen being
ordered to pay $500 million damages. An appeal required posting of a bond
in the amount of 125% of the judgment, making an appeal in Mississippi
virtually impossible for Loewen. 62 Loewen settled and then promptly filed
suit against the U.S. in a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal, alleging violations of
Articles 1102 (because of discrimination against a foreign investor), 1105
(because of a failure to adhere to even a minimum standard of treatment)
and 1110 (because of the excessive verdict and an inability to reasonably
appeal).63 Despite this dramatic fact scenario, Loewen was denied remedy
60 Brian Trevor Hodges, Where the Grass is Always Greener: Foreign Investor Actions
Against Environmental Regulations Under NAFTA 's Chapter I], S.D. Myers, Inc. v.
Canada, 14 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 367,369 (2003).
61 Id. Canada sought judicial review of the case but was denied essentially because of
the broad powers granted under NAFTA Chapter 11. See Judgment, S.D. Myers Inc.
and Gov't of Canada, 76 (Jan. 13 2004), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/SDMyers/SDMyers-Canada-JRT-
FCTDJudgment.pdf.
62 Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42
I.L.M. 811, 812, 1 3-5 (Arb. Trib., Washington, D.C. 2003).
63 Id. at 11 7-8, and 816, 11 39-40 (the appeal was reasonable because the bond
requirement was a percentage of the staggering verdict).
2008] NAFTA CHAPTER 11 TRIBUNALS ASA PARALLEL 107
JUDICIAR Y
due to a lack of jurisdiction. 64 The tribunal's disgust with the Mississippi
court proceedings was obvious throughout the decision and dicta seem to
imply that given adequate jurisdiction, a case similar to this one could be
considered an expropriation.
65
A case like this calls into question the criticisms of those who
complain that NAFTA tribunals are a convenient way for foreign investors
to circumvent the local judicial process and get out without having to
"exhaust all local remedies" because, despite the egregious case facts, the
tribunal declined to get involved, essentially punting the case back to the
U.S. court system. 66  However, the dicta of the Loewen tribunal again
displays strong sentiments in favor of the investor, even if it is hard to feel
any other way when reading the case facts; the acid criticism leveled by the
tribunal towards the Mississippi judge essentially laid blame, from an
international law standpoint, at the door of the U.S. federal government.
67
Some critics take this as a sign that other aggressive foreign investors may
be able to contest decisions by state supreme courts as well as the Supreme
Court of the United States in a Chapter 1 1 tribunal.68 Foreign investors
would thereby gain another tool not available to the domestic investor,
whose ability to challenge a court decision must end domestically.69
Concerned critics call it an "all-out attack on democracy" because it would
thwart the purpose of the jury system.7 °
These critics probably overstate the issue here, as the Loewen's
tribunal can be more accurately described as saying that a court (be it
American, Canadian, or Mexican) can be considered to have expropriated
where it has imposed a decision that discriminates against the foreign
investor on the basis of their status as foreigner.7 '
Loewen displays the opposite problem to the one seen in the S.D.
Myers case because here the foreign investors are villainized and put
through a grueling trial process. Worse, they can neither find an appeal
domestically (due to the high value of the bond required in this case), nor
'4Id. at 7 1.
65 Id., at 817, 44 ("grossly excessive verdict"); at 819, 54 ("Having read the
transcript...we have reached the firm conclusion that the conduct of the trial judge was
so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage ofjustice amounting to a manifest injustice as
that expression is understood in international law.").
" Id. at 819, 54-55.
67 Amy K. Anderson, Note, Individual Rights and Investor Protections in a Trade
Regime: NAFTA and CAFTA, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057, 1069 (2006); see also
Loewen, supra note 62, at 820, 7 57-61; 821, 77 65-69. The tribunal also made special
note that Loewen's counsel failed to object to the prejudicial conduct. Id. at 823, 77 71-
76.
68 Anderson, supra note 67.
69 id.
70 NAFTA: Public Citizen Calls NAFTA Suit Attack on Democracy, Jury System, 15
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2007 (Dec. 2, 1998).
71 Id.
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with a NAFTA Chapter 1 1 tribunal (the tribunal held off from engaging the
merits because Loewen had not yet exhausted all local remedies). Even if a
tribunal were used to overturn a state court decision, the opposite problem
would emerge, where NAFTA would be seen to directly interfere and
overturn a court decision and thereby blatantly violate the sovereignty and
sanctity of that State's courtroom. Xenophobic citizens would have a field
day, no matter the true circumstances of the case.
Loewen is, of course, also an excellent example of why the NAFTA
tribunals are beneficial as they provide a parallel structure for the
acquisition of justice if the rights of the foreign investor are dealt with
unfairly in domestic courts.
72
E. The Methanex Case
Methanex v. United States arose from a legislative ban in California
of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MBTE), a gasoline additive used to increase
octane ratings and reduce tailpipe emissions.73 The California legislature
sought to ban MBTE because of concerns that it would seep into the
groundwater and therefore pose a public health and environmental danger.74
Methanex Corporation is a Canadian corporation that produces
methanol (a major component of MBTE) and because of the California ban
lost a large market for its product. Within ten days of the ban, Methanex
75had lost some $150 million in market capitalization. Methanex brought a
complaint against the U.S. in a NAFTA Chapter 1 1 tribunal, alleging
violations of Articles 1102, 1105 and 11 10, all of which combined to create
76an expropriation. According to the tribunal, however, the law was not
tantamount to an expropriation because it "was made for a public purpose,
was non-discriminatory and was accomplished with due process... [and]
Methanex's claim under Article 1 1 10(1) of expropriation.. fails". 77
72 Amirfar & Dreyer, supra note 7, at 42.
73Methanex Corp. v. United States (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Aug. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15035.pdf See Kara Dougherty,
Comment, Methanex v. United States: The Realignment of NAFTA Chapter 11 with
Environmental Regulation, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 735, 736 (2007).
74 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (EPA), Rep. No. 420-R-99-021, Achieving Clean Air and
Clean Water: The Report of the Blue Ribbon Panel on Oxygenates in Gasoline 76
(1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/fuels/oxypanel/r9902 I.pdf
((MBTE is highly soluble and relatively small amounts can render large
amounts of water unusable due to potential side effects; MBTE is not as
biodegradable as other fuel components).
75 Dougherty, supra note 73, at 739.
76 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Claimant Methanex Corp.'s Second Amended State
of Claim, Methanex Corp. v. U.S., 219-320 (Arb. Trib. 2003), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/15035.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
77 Methanex Corp. v. United States, pt. IV, ch. D, 15 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Aug. 3,
2005), available at
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The Methanex tribunal's analysis chose not to follow the broader
reading of the Metalclad tribunal, and instead opted for a narrower
reading.78 However, the decision once again highlighted the uncertainty
inherent in NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal. In addition, the debate over which
way the Methanex tribunal would rule underscores the tension arising from
this uncertainty and the more general uncertainty inherent in the vague
language of Chapter 11.
79
As noted earlier, Methanex, when looked at in conjunction with
Metalclad, presents an odd picture: because of the lack of precedent in the
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal system, the decisions would appear at odds
with each other. This sort of unpredictability is disliked by businesspeople
and, therefore, confounds the fundamental goal of NAFTA: to promote free
trade.
F. Water Disputes
The allocation of fresh water in the NAFTA bloc is also a cause for
concern as water is used more heavily by more people and sources begin to
dry up due to overuse. 80 Because of this scarcity, NAFTA States are
beginning to squabble over when water becomes a good or commodity, and
therefore becomes subject to the demands of NAFTA. Since that initial
definition is not clear, there is a much higher risk of litigation going against
the States, thereby depriving them of water rights within their own
territory.8 '
This uncertainty has forced Canada to implement a bulk export ban
for water-the fear is that once water from Canada becomes a commodity
on the open market and a "good" as defined by NAFTA, the Canadian
government will be unable to regulate water export, even during droughts.
82
This ban will hold for now, but as water scarcity becomes a larger problem
abroad and in the NAFTA bloc particularly, there will be greater pressure
for Canada to lift the ban and expose itself to international commercial
interests and litigation.8 3
One reason for Canada's trepidation may be because it watched the
Texas water dispute unfold. This dispute arises from the 1944 International
Boundary Waters Treaty signed by the U.S. and Mexico, which laid out
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanex FinalAward.pdf. See also
Lawrence, supra note 54, for excellent discussion of Methanex generally.
78 Lawrence, supra note 54, at 263.
79 Dougherty, supra note 73, at 744.
'o Gregory F. Szydlowski, The Commoditization of Water: A Look at Canadian Bulk
Water Exports, the Texas Water Dispute and the Ongoing Battle Under NAFTA for
Control of Water Resources, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 665, 665-69 (2007).
81 id.
81 Id. at 675-77.
83 Id. at 677.
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rules for apportioning water that flowed in and out of both States.84
Beginning in 1992 and until early 2005, Mexico did not send the required
amounts of water to the U.S., thus causing damage to the agriculture in the
U.S. due to an inadequate water supply from Mexico. Mexico, it seems,
was redirecting the water to certain regions where more water-consumptive
(and lucrative) crops were being grown.85 It would seem, then, that the
Mexican government redirected those waters to advantage domestic
investors at the expense of foreign investors, i.e., the investors in the U.S.
who had been relying on that water, which is a violation of Articles 1102
and 1105; the investors brought a claim under Article 1110 as well.86
Consequently, those U.S. investors are now suing for damages, alleging that
they would have reaped greater rewards had the water had been sent as it
should have been, and their harm amounts to an expropriation under
NAFTA Chapter 11.87
Mexico naturally denies these claims, asserting that water is not a
tradable commodity and therefore cannot be litigated under NAFTA, and
that there is no violation of private rights here since the water rights belong
to the U.S. government, not the investors. 8  This argument could have
carried the day since the Mexican government accumulated water debt
following the procedure laid out in the 1944 Water Treaty and then repaid it
also according to the correct procedures. 89 Given that the investors' water
rights, if they even exist, stem directly from a treaty to which they are not
party, as long as the Mexican government does not violate the treaty, there
can be no problem.90 Also, given that the 1944 Water Treaty creates no
private rights, its provisions operate between two sovereign States and is
therefore really only challengeable between those two entities. 91
The tribunal, in its recently rendered decision, made several
pronouncements and essentially upheld the above assertions of the Mexican
government. First, NAFTA Chapter 11 is not triggered when enterprises
wholly in one State are affected by actions taken in another State. 92 The
tribunal goes on with a discussion explaining that NAFTA Chapter 11 was
84 Id at 679.
85 David M. Quealy, Comment, Bayview Irrigation District, et. al v. United Mexican
States: NAFTA, Foreign Investment and International Trade in Water-A Hard Pill to
Swallow, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 99, 111 (2008).
86 Paul Stanton Kible & Jonathan R. Schulz, Rio Grande Designs: Texans' NAFTA
Water Claim Against Mexico, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 228, 257-58 (2007).
87 Id.
88 Szydlowski, supra note 80, at 681.
89 Kible & Schulz, supra note 86, at 257-58.
90 Id.
91 Id
92 Bayview Irrigation District, et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case
No. Arb.(AF)105/01 23 101 (Arb. Trib. Washington, D.C. 2007), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.org/Disputes/Mexico/Texas/BayviewJurisdictionalAward_19
-05-07.pdf.
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not meant to be wielded broadly and should be construed fairly narrowly to
avoid "unintended results" such as giving domestic investors an ability to
interfere with foreign measures affecting their investment.93 The Texan
investors' assertion of ownership of water in Mexico and having "water
rights" was likewise rejected by the tribunal as being conceptually
problematic. The tribunal then asserted that the water rights of the Texan
investors derived only from the Texan government and, therefore, existed
only in Texas.94 The tribunal concluded that unless the investors made an
investment in Mexico, they could not raise a claim under NAFTA Chapter
11. 9 5 While this is an encouraging ruling, it should be remembered that
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal findings are not binding-theoretically, there
is nothing to prevent a future tribunal from finding differently from a prior
tribunal.
The Texas water disputes and the Canadian ban on bulk water
exports highlight the potential for private individuals from the NAFTA bloc
to directly interfere with the relations of sovereign States, thereby
circumventing the democratic process generally. This last case study ended
well enough (from a sovereignty standpoint), but the reverberations have
been strong enough for Canada to be completely unwilling to expose itself
to liability, despite the opportunity for great profits. Even though the Texas
case was resolved favorably to the interests of State actors, as opposed to
private actors, Canada may still be unwilling to enter the fray because of the
unpredictability of the NAFTA tribunal system due to the lack of a uniform
body of law to interpret and a lack of precedent.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Thus far this Note has briefly surveyed some of the major disputes
that have been brought before a NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal. This Note is
meant to provide a solid surface from which to make some observations
about how these tribunals are affecting the legal system of the U.S. and
likely also those of Canada and Mexico. Each case study, though brief, was
meant to highlight a different problem and potential effects on a NAFTA
Party's legal system.
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals, as they stand, can be capricious and
arbitrary, meddlesome in the laws of States, damaging to the finality of
judicial awards and potentially can have ramifications even between the
relations of two sovereign States. This Note does not intend to be partisan
and demand either a repeal or a massive overhaul of NAFTA Chapter 11.
93 Id. at 103-08.
14Id. at 113-19.
95 Id. at 122.
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Instead, this Note merely seeks to make the potential pitfalls more
noticeable and urge some stronger, more coherent and less nebulous
boundaries to NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals so that they can operate within
well-defined limits and not tempt the avarice of investors at the expense of
the environment, public health and the autonomy of States and their legal
systems.
In the meantime, enterprising individuals should take advantage of
a system that is so loose and inconsistent. For the small- or medium-sized
business owner, expanding into a foreign market within the NAFTA bloc
potentially creates a number of advantages. First, concerns about denial of
justice in the domestic system are considerably allayed because of the
parallel tribunal system that NAFTA has created. Second, this parallel
system creates an inherent advantage for foreign businesses since they not
only have an extra level of appeals, but also can effectively circumvent
environmental and health regulations that are more stringently applied to
domestic entities. Last, the uncertainty inherent in this system creates
another advantage as it is likely to result in tentativeness in most other
businesses, opening up opportunities for the bold. Naturally, the risks
involved are increased due to the inherent uncertainty surrounding the
system, but then larger rewards tend to be reaped in riskier situations.
Another avenue of potential profit will arise when the FTAA is
finalized. The FTAA is based at least partially on NAFTA and the tribunal
process of the FTAA may become more refined. Therefore, studying the
lessons of NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals may give enterprising individuals
an advantage when and if the FTAA is eventually implemented, allowing
quicker entry into a newer market with (hopefully) fewer complications.
